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I. INTRODUCTION
Mark Zuckerberg, the twenty-eight-year-old1 founder and chief
executive officer of Facebook,2 said in 2010 that “[u]p until recently, the
default on the Web has been that most things aren’t social and most things
don’t use your real identity. . . . We’re building towards a Web where the
default is social.”3 And social it is: during the past eight years, people across
the globe have developed a voracious appetite for social media and show no
signs of slowing down.4 Facebook, founded in 2004, had one billion active
monthly users and 584 million daily users by the close of 2012.5 Twitter,6
founded as recently as 2006,7 boasted over 500 million accountholders by
2012.8 YouTube,9 launched in 2005, currently facilitates over four billion
video views per day.10 Google+,11 the newest addition, began in June 2011

1. World’s
Most
Powerful
People—Mark
Zuckerberg,
FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/profile/mark-zuckerberg/ (last updated Nov. 2011).
2. Management, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=1 (last
visited Jan. 11, 2013). Facebook is a social networking website that allows users to create personal
profiles, add other users as “friends,” and communicate with those friends by sharing updates,
photos,
videos,
and
other
content.
See
Facebook—About,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
3. Mark Zuckerberg, Founder, Facebook, Keynote Speech at the F8 Conference (Apr. 21,
2010), available at http://www.livestream.com/f8conference/video?clipId=pla_e7a096b4-3ef9-466d9a37-d920c31040aa.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 5–10.
5. Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last
visited Jan. 11, 2013).
6. Twitter is a social media website self-described as a “real-time information network”
whereby users can post Tweets of 140 characters or less and connect with other users by following
them and sending personal messages. About, TWITTER, twitter.com/about (last visited Jan. 11,
2013).
7. Nicholas Carlson, The Real History of Twitter, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-04-13/tech/29957143_1_jack-dorsey-twitter-podcasting.
8. Twitter Reaches Half a Billion Accounts, SEMIOCAST (July 30, 2012),
http://semiocast.com/publications/2012_07_30_Twitter_reaches_half_a_billion_accounts_140m_in_
the_US.
9. YouTube is a website that hosts video content and allows people to watch and upload
videos. About YouTube, YOUTUBE, www.youtube.com/t/about_youtube (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
10. Andrew Couts, YouTube: Now Serving 4 Billion+ Video Views Daily, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan.
23,
2012),
http://news.yahoo.com/youtube-now-serving-4-billion-video-views-daily173018803.html.
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and reported a user base of 90 million within six months.12 The memorable
line from the film The Social Network13 echoes louder and louder as social
media solidifies its grip on the modern world: “We lived on farms and then
we lived in cities and now we’re gonna live on the [I]nternet.”14
All this living on the Internet raises a myriad of issues in the
employment context.15 On one hand, companies embrace social media as a
powerful marketing tool that facilitates employee connections with clients,
potential customers, and other industry professionals.16 Employers can
further utilize social media to help locate new talent; in 2011, eighty-nine
percent of companies said they used social media for recruitment purposes.17

11. Google+ is a social networking and identity service operated by Google, which incorporates
existing services such as Google Profiles with new onesnamely, Circles, Hangouts, and
Gamesand allows users to tailor their online sharing to specific groups. Learn More, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/+/learnmore/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013); see also Martin Kaste, Facebook’s
Newest
Challenger:
Google
Plus,
NPR
(June
29,
2011,
5:35
PM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/29/137507567/facebooks-newest-challenger-google-plus.
12. Lucas Shaw, Google 4Q Earnings Miss the Mark, Google Plus Hits 90M Subs, REUTERS
(Jan. 19, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/idUS427563801220120119.
For more information regarding social media’s steep rise in popularity, see generally Jenise Uehara
Henriskson, The Growth of Social Media: An Infographic, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.searchenginejournal.com/the-growth-of-social-media-an-infographic/32788/.
13. The Social Network is a feature film released in 2010 about the founders of Facebook. See
THE SOCIAL NETWORK, http://www.thesocialnetwork-movie.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
14. AARON SORKIN, THE SOCIAL NETWORK, 155 (screenplay), available at
http://flash.sonypictures.com/video/movies/thesocialnetwork/awards/thesocialnetwork_screenplay.p
df.
15. See infra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
16. See Rhianna Collier, SIIA Survey: Marketing Executives Believe Social Media Is an Effective
Tool; Not Yet Investing Significant Resources, SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUSTRY ASS’N (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://www.siia.net/blog/index.php/2012/02/siia-survey-marketing-executives-believe-social-mediais-an-effective-tool-not-yet-investing-significant-resources/. “Social media has clearly become a
widely used tool among [business-to-business] marketers and few doubt that it is helping their
business.” Id.; see also Joshua Tucker, CEO Bans Email, Encourages Social Networking,
ENGADGET (Dec. 1, 2011, 12:33 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2011/12/01/ceo-bans-emailencourages-social-networking/ (reporting that the chief executive officer of a French information
technology firm plans to “ween 80,000 employees off” of email during the next eighteen months,
and instead promotes a “collaborative social network similar to Facebook or Twitter to fill email’s
void and suffice as an easily accessible global network”).
17. Kristin Piombino, Infographic: 89 Percent of Companies Use Social Media to Find New
Hires, RAGAN’S HR COMM. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.hrcommunication.com/SocialMedia/
Articles/Infographic_89_percent_of_companies_use_social_med_7260.aspx. LinkedIn, a dominant
player in social media recruitment, “isn’t the only social network that’s used for recruiting. Fifty
percent of companies use Facebook to find talent, and [forty-five] percent use Twitter.” Id.
By the same token, the Internet affords “a potential, and tempting, treasure trove of
information about prospective employees,” and employers must be careful not to use social media
websites to obtain improper data concerning applicants (including, for example, race, national origin,
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On the other hand, social media websites can raise significant liability issues
for employers.18 Whereas “[d]isgruntled employees . . . once griped to each
other in person,” they are now free to “complain about their workplace” on
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, personal blogs, or whatever other Internet
outlet they choose.19 Social media websites can thus “expose employers to
risks of potential defamation claims, improper disclosure of confidential
information, and damage to an employer’s reputation.”20 The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) began addressing these types of
issues in late 2009,21 and, since then, the Board has heard a steadily
increasing number of social media cases across the country.22
Consider, for example, the headline-grabbing23 2010 case of American
Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.,24 which illustrates the nature of the

or religion in order to screen applicants based on a protected class). Robert Sprague, Rethinking
Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 395, 398–99
(2008). Furthermore, twenty-nine states have adopted “lifestyle statutes” that prohibit employers
from considering off-duty conduct (such as drinking, smoking, overeating, and personal relations) in
hiring or firing decisions “so long as the off-duty activities have no employment-related
consequences.” Carolyn Elefant, The “Power” of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best Practices for
Utilities Engaging Social Media, 32 ENERGY L.J. 1, 15 (2011).
18. Peter J. Pizzi, Where Cyber and Employment Law Intersect, Risks for Management Abound,
in UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW 29, 29 (2011), available at 2011 WL
3020563.
19. Id.
20. Id.; see generally Julianne Pepitone, 6 Painful Social Media Screwups, CNNMONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2011/technology/1104/gallery.social_media_controversies/index.htm
l (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
21. In Sears Holdings, the Board interpreted the validity of an employer’s social media policy; it
refrained, however, from addressing what constitutes protected employee activity in the social media
realm. Sears Holdings, N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Mem. Case No. 18-CA-19081 (Dec. 4, 2009),
available at http:/mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45802d802f [hereinafter Sears
Holdings]. The Board developed its position on the matter in later cases. See infra notes 136–75. In
Sears Holdings, an electrical workers’ union, throughout its campaign to organize service
technicians, utilized several types of social media—including Facebook, Myspace, and a specifically
tailored website and group email subscription service—for the purpose of fostering communication
among employees. Sears Holdings, supra, at 1–2. The employer later issued a social media policy
that prohibited employees from using social media for “[d]isparagement of [the] company’s or
competitors’ products, services, executive leadership, employees, strategy, and business products.”
Id. at 3. The Board ultimately concluded that Sears’ policy was valid because it could not be
reasonably interpreted to chill employees’ protected speech under the National Labor Relations Act;
rather, a reasonable reading of the policy showed that it only prohibited “online sharing of
confidential intellectual property or egregiously inappropriate language and not . . . protected
complaints about the [e]mployer or working conditions.” Id. at 6–7. For a detailed discussion
concerning the history and meaning of protected employee activity, see infra notes 47–135 and
accompanying text. For further information about lawful social media policies under the National
Labor Relations Act, see infra notes 233–53 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 136–75 and accompanying text.
23. See Sam Hananel, Woman Fired over Facebook Rant; Suit Follows, NBC NEWS.COM (Nov.
10, 2010, 9:43 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40097443/; Renée M. Jackson, Media Frenzy
over NLRB Complaint Against Connecticut Employer for Terminating Employee Who Criticized
Employer on Facebook Not Warranted—Yet, NIXON PEABODY (Nov. 16, 2010),
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problem facing employers and employees in the current virtual landscape.
There, the NLRB addressed for the first time whether an employee could
publish disparaging speech against her employer on a social media website.25
The employee Souza posted a series of negative comments about her
supervisor to her Facebook page following a confrontation with him at
work.26 Specifically, she referred to her supervisor as a “scumbag,” a “17
[AMR code for a psychiatric patient],” and a “dick.”27 Several of Souza’s
current and former coworkers chimed in and commented on her post, saying
things like “I’m so glad I left [AMR]” and encouraging Souza to “[c]hin
up!”28 AMR later fired Souza, listing her Facebook comments as one of the
reasons for her termination.29 The social media policy at AMR prohibited
“making disparaging, discriminatory or defamatory comments when
discussing the [c]ompany or the employee’s superiors, co-workers and/or
competitors.”30 The Board’s regional office filed a complaint against AMR,
alleging that the employer violated federal labor law by terminating Souza
for her Facebook comments.31 Though the case ultimately settled, as part of
the settlement AMR agreed to narrow the scope of its social media policy.32
Granted, the Board never actually decided AMR.33 The case is
especially important, however, because it prompted the NLRB Acting
General Counsel Lafe Solomon to declare the Board’s position on social
media cases—namely, that communicating via social network websites is

http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/ELA_Alert_11_16_10.pdf; Sara Yin, Connecticut Woman Fired
Over
Facebook
Rant,
PCMAG.COM
(Nov.
10,
2010,
1:29
PM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372465,00.asp.
24. Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc. (AMR), N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Mem. Case No. 34CA-12576
(Oct.
5,
2010),
available
at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055b9c4 [hereinafter AMR].
25. Id. at 1; Hananel, supra note 23 (indicating that the Board referred to the case as “the first
complaint [it had] issued over comments on Facebook . . . .”).
26. AMR, supra note 24, at 3.
27. Id. (alteration in original).
28. Id. at 3–4.
29. Id. at 4–5.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Settlement Reached in Case Involving Discharge for Facebook Comments, NLRB (Feb. 8,
2011), http://nlrb.gov/news/settlement-reached-case-involving-discharge-facebook-comments.
32. Id. AMR agreed “to revise its overly-broad rules to ensure that they do not improperly
restrict employees from discussing their wages, hours and working conditions with co-workers and
others while not at work, and that they would not discipline or discharge employees for engaging in
such discussions.” Id.
33. See id.
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“the same as talking at the water cooler.”34 The proverbial water cooler, in
the context of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), is the
quintessential safe haven for employees.35 It traditionally referred to the
place where employees came together and discussed working conditions,
and the NLRA mandates that those types of discussions be protected from
adverse employment actions.36 The General Counsel’s analogizing
Facebook to the water cooler indicates the Board’s strong push, from the
outset, toward shielding employee statements on social media websites from
employers. Indeed, the Board’s recent decisions since AMR demonstrate
that it has continued along the same line of analysis.37 In this respect, the
Board is misguided.38 Facebook—as well as Twitter, YouTube, Google+,
and all the other burgeoning social media websites available to employees in
the United States today—is nothing like a water cooler, and should not be
understood as such.39 Rather, social media deserves a separate analytical
framework that recognizes the unique and evolving character of modern
communication.40
This Comment explores whether employees engage in protected
concerted activity under the NLRA when they post negative statements
about their employers to social media websites. Part II explains the
definition of protected concerted activity under the NLRA, as interpreted by
the Board through several landmark decisions from the past several
decades.41 Part III discusses the Board’s current application of its precedent
to recent cases involving social media.42 Part IV argues that such precedent
is inadequate to address the distinct qualities of social media and that the
Board has misapplied dated law to recent cases involving social media.43
Part V sets forth recommendations for alternate ways to analyze social
media communication and makes suggestions regarding how employers can

34. David Alim-Young, NLRB Weighs in on Social Networking—”The Facebook Complaint,”
NLRB INSIGHT (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.nlrbinsight.com/2011/02/nlrb-weighs-in-on-socialnetworking-the-facebook-complaint/.
35. See NLRB Judge Finds Firings Based on Facebook Posting Unlawful, HRWATCHDOG
(Sept. 12, 2011, 9:42 AM), http://calchamber.typepad.com/hrwatchdog/2011/09/nlrb-judge-findsfirings-based-on-facebook-posting-unlawful.html.
36. Id. “The typical example of a protected activity is when employees gather around the water
cooler to complain about their supervisor.” Id. For more information as to what it means to be a
protected activity, see infra Part II.
37. See infra notes 136–75 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 233–66 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 233–66 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 233–66 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 47–135 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 136–75 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 176–232 and accompanying text.
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tailor their social media policies to comply with Board standards.44 Part VI
examines the impact of this Comment’s approach on both employers and
employees.45 Part VII concludes.46
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY UNDER THE
NLRA
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, which gave
employees the federal right to organize and bargain collectively.47 The
purpose of the Act was to prevent “unfair practices” between employers and
employees that had the effect of obstructing the free flow of commerce.48 Its
current version incorporates the original Wagner Act of 1935,49 the Taft–
Hartley amendments of 1947,50 and some small changes from the Landrum–
Griffin Act of 1959.51 Indeed, the text of the NLRA “has remained virtually
untouched since 1959.”52 The Act covers employer–employee relations in

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
reads:

See infra notes 233–53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 254–66 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 267–81 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158 (2006).
Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F.2d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1938). The Act’s policy declaration

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
The Board website states that the NLRA was enacted “to protect the rights of employees and
employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector labor and
management practices, which can harm the general welfare of workers, businesses, and the U.S.
economy.” National Labor Relations Act, NLRB, http://nlrb.gov/national-labor-relations-act (last
visited Jan. 21, 2013).
49. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner–Connery Labor Relations Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)).
50. Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
51. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum–Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
52. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1533 (2002). Estlund writes, “[o]ne of the most striking features of American labor law is the age of
its basic governing text.” Id. at 1532.
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the context of labor disputes affecting interstate commerce.53 The National
Labor Relations Board and its General Counsel constitute the enforcement
mechanism of the NLRA, acting through regional and field offices across
the country.54
Section 7 of the Act expressly provides for the following employee
rights, the last of which is at issue in cases involving employee speech via
social media: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection . . . .”55 Employees who engage in “concerted activities” are
therefore sheltered from adverse employment actions in retaliation.56 The
Act prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees who choose to exercise these rights.57 The NLRA does not
specifically state what constitutes a “concerted activity,” and so the Board
has interpreted and defined the term through case-by-case determinations
since the Act’s inception.58
Concerted activities encompass lawful union activities as well as
nonunion group activities.59 The most important aspect of a concerted
activity is that it relates to wages, hours, or working conditions.60 Once this

53. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). The term “employee” includes non-supervisory employees who are
either members of a union or trying to unionize. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563–64
(1978).
54. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2006); What We Do, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last
visited Jan. 25, 2013).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (emphasis added).
56. Calvin William Sharpe, “By Any Means Necessary”—Unprotected Conduct and Decisional
Discretion Under the National Labor Relations Act, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 206
(1999).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this
title . . . .”).
58. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) (“The Wagner Act did not
undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and unmistakable language each incident
which would constitute an unfair labor practice. On the contrary, that Act left to the Board the work
of applying the Act’s general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events
which might be charged as violative of its terms. Thus a ‘rigid scheme of remedies’ is avoided and
administrative flexibility within appropriate statutory limitations obtained to accomplish the
dominant purpose of the legislation.”).
59. See Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1953)
(“Concerted activity may take place where one person is seeking to induce action from a group.”);
NLRB v. Phx. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948) (“A proper construction [of
section 157 of the Act] is that the employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities . . .
even though no union activity be involved, or collective bargaining be contemplated.”).
60. See Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 317, 319 (1976). The administrative law
judge held, and the NLRB affirmed, that “[i]t is the public policy of the United States, however,
embodied in the Act, to insulate from discharge or discipline any employee who refuses to work in
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threshold is met, the activity remains protected regardless of whether it is
illogical or unreasonable in nature.61 In previous cases, the NLRB has been
careful to shield concerted activities from adverse employment actions—
even in situations where an individual’s conduct arguably may be
inappropriate or, in some cases, categorically outrageous—in order to
uphold the important rights of employees to organize and work together to
address working conditions.62
A. Board Precedent: The Landmark Cases
The NLRB has relied on several important decisions in determining
whether an activity in the online social media context is concerted, and thus
protected, under the NLRA.63 Of the five cases highlighted below, four were
decided before 1985 and have nothing to do with the Internet, much less
social media in the workplace.64 The fifth case, decided in 2007, touches

order to pressure his employer to make concessions concerning his wages, rates of pay, hours, or
working conditions.” Id.
61. Id. The employer in Evergreen Helicopters, Inc. argued that its employees’ conduct was
unreasonable and therefore not protected. Id. In that case, ten employees refused to work until they
were paid the higher wages that the company promised to them, even when their supervisor offered
to pay them out of his own pocket if they would go back to work. Id. at 318–19. The administrative
law judge ruled that the employer’s argument was “irrelevant” because “it is not necessary that
employees strike for a reasonable objective in order to enjoy the Act’s protection, it is only
necessary that the object be related to securing wages, etc.” Id. at 319.
62. See NLRB v. Allied Aviation Fueling of Dall. LP, 490 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that
union employee who forged another employee’s signature on a grievance he filed on the other
employee’s behalf was engaging in protected activity because he did not act for his own benefit but
rather for the protection of the other employee’s rights); Roadmaster Corp. v. NLRB, 874 F.2d 448
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a union officer’s public speech regarding a company mislabeling a
controversy was protected concerted activity); Nordstrom, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 294 (2006)
(determining that when employees refused to speak to a coworker who testified in a Board hearing
on behalf of the employer, they were engaged in protected concerted activity; the Board reasoned
that their nonverbal solidarity related to wages, hours, and terms of employment, and such behavior
was similar to verbal outbursts toward antiunion employees), overruled on other grounds by J & R
Flooring, Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. 9 (2010); Oakes Mach. Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 456 (1990) (holding that
employees’ sending a letter to the employer’s chairman that was unsigned and criticized the
president’s ability to manage the company was protected concerted activity); Lumbee Farms Coop.,
285 N.L.R.B. 497 (1987) (stating employees’ activity was protected when they walked out to protest
the employer’s hiring of “foreigners” and to demand a wage increase); Millcraft Furniture Co., 282
N.L.R.B. 593 (1987) (deciding that conduct was protected when employees insisted on delivering
grievances to a manager other than the manager who was assigned to receive grievances).
63. See infra notes 66–135 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 66–101, 110–14 and accompanying text. There are two additional cases to
which the Board has looked frequently in social media cases, but they are not included in this
Comment. The first is the Supreme Court case of NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9
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briefly on Internet publication; however, the facts do not involve socialmedia-related concerted activity, but instead revolve around more traditional
forms of union activity and expression against employers.65
1. Meyers Industries, Inc.66 and Its Progeny: Focusing on Group Action,
Not Individual Interests
The Meyers line of cases,67 decided in the 1980s, established that an
individual employee’s activity must be linked to the actions of fellow
employees in order to be classified as “concerted” under the NLRA.68 These
four cases involved Kenneth Prill, a truck driver who was hired by Meyers
Industries, Inc. to drive a company-issued truck and trailer and haul boats
from the employer’s facility in Michigan to dealers across the United
States.69 Prill began experiencing brake and steering problems with his
equipment and complained about these deficiencies to the president of the
company, his supervisor, and the company’s mechanic.70 Despite these
complaints, Meyers Industries never fully addressed the problems with
Prill’s equipment, and the trailer brakes continued to cause Prill trouble.71
On a return trip from a drive to Florida, Prill was involved in an accident in
Tennessee.72 Prill contacted the company president several times, and when
the president requested that Prill tow the trailer back to Michigan, Prill

(1962), and the second is the First Circuit case of NLRB v. Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981). These decisions deal primarily with employers’ authority to discipline employees when they
engage in protected activities, as well as the nature of unfair labor practices in similar types of
situations. See Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 17–18; Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 908–09. Although
issues surrounding discipline and adverse employment actions generally arise when employees are
punished for engaging in protected activities, those subjects exceed the scope of this Comment,
which focuses on the modern limits of concerted activity in the Internet realm.
65. See infra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.
66. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984).
67. The procedural history of these four cases is as follows. In Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493
(1984), the Board dismissed employee Prill’s complaint and held that Prill’s activities were not
“concerted” under the NLRA. In Prill v. NLRB (Prill I), 755 F.2d 941, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985), on
Prill’s petition for review, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to the Board
for further consideration. On remand, in Meyers Industries, Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882,
888–89 (1986), the Board reached the same conclusion as it did in Meyers I, but modified its
reasoning based on the decision of the circuit court. Finally, in Prill v. NLRB (Prill II), 835 F.2d
1481, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the D.C. Circuit affirmed the Board’s ruling in Meyers II.
68. See Prill II, 835 F.2d at 1484–85; Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 889; Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at
497, 499.
69. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497.
70. Id. The “most significant problem” was that the brakes on his trailer failed to operate
properly. Id. at 504.
71. Id. at 497.
72. Id. at 497, 504. The accident was not Prill’s fault, as the malfunctioning brakes caused the
accident. See id. at 497, 504. Meyers Industries asserted that the crash was not a consideration in
Prill’s later termination. Id. at 504–05.

1010

04 FERRALL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[Vol. 40: 1001, 2013]

5/15/13 8:24 PM

Concerted Activity and Social Media
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

refused, citing safety concerns.73 Prill further arranged to have the local
public service commission inspect his equipment following the accident,
which resulted in a citation prohibiting the unsafe operation of a vehicle.74
When Prill returned to work after the conclusion of his trip, Meyers
Industries terminated Prill, stating, “[W]e can’t have you calling the cops
like this all the time.”75
The Board determined that Prill did not engage in concerted activity
when he complained about the unsafe conditions of his equipment to both
the company president and state authorities and when he refused to drive the
truck and trailer for safety reasons following an accident.76 In so doing, the
Board created a new definition for concerted activity, which remains in
place today: an employee’s conduct does not qualify for protection under the
Act unless it is “engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and
not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.”77 Because Prill was
acting alone and “solely on his own behalf” when he made his complaints,
his conduct did not fall within the protected category of concerted activity
under the NLRA.78 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals later

73. Id. at 504–05.
74. Id. at 497. Following this citation, Meyers Industries determined that the trailer was not
worth returning or even being repaired. Id. Rather, the company decided to leave the trailer and sell
it for scrap. Id. Prill drove his truck back to Meyers Industries’ facility in Michigan without the
trailer. Id.
75. Id. at 498. Prior to this incident, on another trip to Ohio, Prill had voluntarily stopped at an
Ohio State roadside inspection station where officials cited the trailer for defects. Id. at 497. Prill
provided the citation information to Meyers Industries at that time. Id.
76. Id. at 498. The Board emphasized the individualized nature of Prill’s activity and
complaints: “Prill alone refused to drive the truck and trailer; he alone contacted the Tennessee
Public Service Commission after the accident; and, prior to the accident, he alone contacted the Ohio
authorities. Prill acted solely on his own behalf.” Id.
77. Id. at 497 (emphasis added). The Board honed in on the “united-action interpretation” of
concerted activity when it stated that Section 7 “envisions ‘concerted’ action in terms of collective
activity: the formation of or assistance to a group, or action as a representative on behalf of a group.”
Id. at 493–94. This type of group effort stands in stark contrast to Prill’s self-serving behavior, as
characterized by the Board. See supra note 76.
78. Id. at 498. Meyers I overruled the “per se standard of concerted activity” that prevailed at
the time under Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975). Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495, 499.
In Alleluia, an employee, Henley, repeatedly complained to his employer about safety concerns in
the workplace. Alleluia, 221 N.L.R.B. at 999. Henley never enlisted the help of his fellow
employees in voicing those complaints, and the administrative law judge who heard the case
determined that “Henley was acting . . . purely on the basis of his individual concern with safety . . . .
There is no evidence that Henley was acting in conjunction with any other employee in
protesting . . . or that his activity had been an outgrowth or extension of discussions with other
employees.” Id. at 1004 (citations omitted). Despite this finding, the Board ultimately ruled on
appeal that Henley was engaged in concerted activity because he sought to compel compliance with
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affirmed the Board’s conclusion in Meyers I and Meyers II, stating that
protection under the Act extends when “individual employees seek to initiate
or to induce or to prepare for group action,” as well as when “individual
employees bring[] truly group complaints to the attention of management.”79
Thus, had Prill merely contacted his coworkers to contest the violation of
statutory safety provisions, he would have been protected under the Act.80
The test for concerted activity elucidated in Meyers continues to be the
principal guidepost for the NLRB today.81
2. Atlantic Steel Company: Setting Boundaries and Losing Protection
Due to Opprobrious Conduct
The 1979 case of Atlantic Steel Co.82 demonstrates the way in which
employees engaged in protected concerted activities can, by the nature of
their conduct, lose the protection afforded to them under the Act.83 Here, the
employee Chastain approached his foreman during work hours and made an
inquiry regarding the assignment of overtime by seniority, as he was
concerned that an employee with probationary status had been assigned to
work overtime.84 Upon hearing the foreman’s response that all of the crew
was asked to take overtime, Chastain turned to a coworker as the foreman
was walking away and either called the foreman a “lying son of a bitch” or
said that the foreman told a “‘m—f—lie’ (or was a ‘m—f—liar’).”85 The
foreman heard Chastain’s statement, and Chastain was suspended pending
discharge and eventually terminated.86

safety standards that “encompassed the well-being of his fellow employees.” Id. at 1001.
Meyers I criticized Alleluia as “transform[ing] concerted activity into a mirror image of
itself” whereby the Board could decide “what ought to be of group concern and then artificially
presume[] that it is of group concern.” Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495, 496. In rejecting the Alleluia
precedent, Meyers I held that “finding that a particular form of individual activity warrants group
support is not a sufficient basis for labeling that activity ‘concerted’ within the meaning of Section
7.” Id. at 496. In Prill II, then, the court highlighted that although Prill’s complaints about his truck
and refusal to tow it may have benefited his fellow employees, “Prill acted alone” and was thus not
engaged in concerted activity. Prill II, 835 F.2d 1481, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
79. Prill II, 835 F.2d at 1484. The court noted that Congress intended Section 7 to equalize
employees’ bargaining power by enabling employees to “band together in confronting an employer”
regarding issues affecting the terms and conditions of their employment. Id. (emphasis omitted).
80. Id. at 1485. The concept of reaching out to one’s fellow employees is especially relevant in
analyzing current social media cases. See infra notes 215–32 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 136–75 and accompanying text.
82. 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979).
83. Id. at 817.
84. Id. at 814.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Chastain’s questions regarding overtime fell within the realm of
protected concerted activity, as he was voicing a “legitimate concern” on
behalf of his fellow employees regarding working conditions.87 However,
the offensive and disparaging nature of Chastain’s conduct was such that the
activity could no longer be shielded under the NLRA.88 The Board stated:
“[E]ven an employee who is engaged in concerted protected activity can, by
opprobrious conduct, lose the protection of the Act.”89 A determination
regarding whether an employee “has crossed that line” involves balancing
the following four factors: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject
matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the outburst; and (4) whether the
outburst was provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice in any way.90

87. Id. at 817. “Chastain had properly questioned the foreman about overtime, and . . . the
foreman had acted promptly to answer the question.” Id. at 814.
88. Id. at 816–17. The fact that Chastain’s comments took place on the production floor made
the case distinguishable from situations where employee statements occurred in “formal grievances
or negotiating sessions which were conducted away from the production area.” Id. at 816. An
employee may be permitted to utter obscenities or use strong language “in the heat of discussion”
when it occurs as part of the grievance procedure. Id. at 816; see NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co.,
351 F.2d 584, 586–87 (7th Cir. 1965) (stating that an employee’s use of an obscenity in
superintendent’s office during a grievance meeting did not remove protection under the Act); see
also NLRB v. Cement Transp., Inc., 490 F.2d 1024, 1030 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that an
employee’s statement, referring to the company president as a “son-of-a-bitch,” was still protected
when it took place during an organizational campaign).
89. Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816 (emphasis added); see also Care Initiatives, Inc., 321
N.L.R.B 144, 151 (1996) (“Among the specific types of conduct that could exceed the protection of
the Act are vulgar, profane, and obscene language directed at a supervisor or employer . . . .”).
In Atlantic Steel, the Board upheld the arbitrator’s conclusion that Chastain’s use of insulting
language “to other employees about their supervisor in the hearing of the supervisor cannot be
regarded as ‘mere disrespect.’ On the contrary it shows a willful disregard for constituted industrial
authority . . . . Under any definition, this, in the setting it was found, constitutes insubordination.”
245 N.L.R.B. at 815.
90. Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816. In applying these factors to the instant case, the
arbitrator’s analysis took into account that the incident was on the production floor during work
hours and not at a grievance meeting. Id. at 816–17. The arbitrator further noted that even though
Chastain’s questions and the foreman’s response were both legitimate, Chastain’s reaction was so
obscene—and without provocation—in a setting where such behavior was not normally permitted
that Chastain’s conduct fell outside the protections of the Act. Id. at 817.
On November 9, 2010, the NLRB posted this four-pronged test from Atlantic Steel on its
Facebook page in the form of a wall post. National Labor Relations Board’s Profile, FACEBOOK
(Nov. 9, 2010, 12:23 PM), http://www.facebook.com/NLRBpage/posts/141052949280338. The post
read, “What’s the line? When do Facebook comments lose protected concerted activity status under
the National Labor Relations Act? A four point test applies . . . .” and it went on to list the four
factors. Id.
The NLRB also added two comments under this same post. Id. The first comment dealt
more broadly with the subject of protected concerted activity: “The NLRA protects employees’
rights to engage in protected concerted activities with or without a union. Included is the right of
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The Board affirmed the arbitrator’s decision and held that based on the
above factors, Chastain’s statements were not protected, and his discharge
was therefore warranted.91
3. Jefferson Standard: Relating to an Ongoing Labor Dispute; Must Not
Be So Disloyal, Reckless, or Untrue as to Lose the Protections
of the Act
The 1953 United States Supreme Court case of NLRB v. Local Union
No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard)92 is also important in determining when
employees can lose the protection of the Act. It involved technicians
working for the radio station WBT, which was located in Charlotte, North
Carolina and broadcasted both radio and television daily.93 The technicians
were represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
and when their negotiations with the station reached an impasse over an
arbitration provision, the union began conventional and peaceful picketing
outside the station.94 Over a month after the picketing had begun, several
technicians “launched a vitriolic attack on the quality of the company’s
television broadcasts” by printing and distributing five thousand handbills
which read:
IS CHARLOTTE A SECOND-CLASS CITY?
You might think so from the kind of Television programs being
presented by the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co. over WBTV.

two or more employees to discuss terms and conditions of employment.” Id. It also provided a link
to the NLRB website page explaining protected concerted activity. Id.
The second comment narrowed in on the specific issue of employees’ Facebook comments, in light
of the November 2010 NLRB case in which social media speech was analyzed for the first time
under the NLRA. Id. It noted that Lafe Solomon, the Board’s acting General Counsel, was quoted
in the New York Times as saying: “This is a fairly straightforward case under the National Labor
Relations Act—whether it takes place on Facebook or at the water cooler, it was employees talking
jointly about working conditions, in this case about their supervisor, and they have a right to do
that.” Id. The comment then posted a link to the New York Times news story. See Steven
Greenhouse, Company Accused of Firing over Facebook Post, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/business/09facebook.html.
91. Atlantic Steel, 245 N.L.R.B. at 816–17. The Board noted that a contrary result in this case
“would mean that any employee’s offhand complaint would be protected activity which would
shield any obscene insubordination short of physical violence.” Id. at 817.
92. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953). The case is
known as “Jefferson Standard” after the name of the employer, Jefferson Standard Broadcasting
Company.
93. Id. at 466.
94. Id. at 467. The union also had placards and handbills on the picket line, which named the
union as the representative of the technicians and accused the company of acting unfairly with
respect to the arbitration provision at issue. Id.
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Have you seen one of their television programs lately? Did you
know that all the programs presented over WBTV are on film and
may be from one day to five years old. There are no local programs
presented by WBTV. You cannot receive the local baseball games,
football games or other local events because WBTV does not have
the proper equipment to make these pickups. Cities like New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, Washington receive such programs nightly.
Why doesn’t the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company
purchase the needed equipment to bring you the same type of
programs enjoyed by other leading American cities? Could it be
that they consider Charlotte a second-class community and only
entitled to the pictures now being presented to them?95
These handbills did not reference the union, nor did they indicate that
there was a pending labor controversy; they simply bore the “WBT
Technicians” designation.96
The Supreme Court upheld the company’s decision to terminate the
technicians who disseminated the disparaging handbills.97 The Court
reasoned that because the communication in the handbills was not identified
as being related to an ongoing labor dispute—even though a labor dispute
was in fact occurring at the time the handbills were disbursed—the activity
was not protected under the NLRA, and the employer therefore had the right
to terminate the employees for cause.98 The technicians in this case made a
“concerted separable attack purporting to be . . . in the interest of the public
rather than in that of the employees.”99 As such, because the attack was
separated from the labor controversy, the company was permitted to

95. Id. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted). The workers distributed the handbills on the
picket line and in the public square several blocks away from where the company was located. Id.
They were also distributed in barbershops, restaurants, and buses, and some were mailed to local
businesses. Id. The distribution continued for ten days. Id. at 471.
96. Id. at 468.
97. Id. at 472.
98. Id. at 476–77.
99. Id. at 477. The only connection the court could find between the handbill and the labor
dispute was “an ultimate and undisclosed purpose or motive on the part of some of the sponsors that,
by the hoped-for financial pressure, the attack might extract from the company some future
concession.” Id. This requirement of explicitly tying the communication to a labor dispute has not
changed in more recent Board analyses. The Board reached the very same conclusion when
analyzing similar facts in the 2000 case American Golf Corp., which held that an employee’s public
distribution of a flyer that was damaging to his employer’s product and business policies was not
protected activity, as the attack was made with the undisclosed purpose of influencing negotiations.
Am. Golf Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1241–42 (2000).
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discharge the technicians based on their conduct “as if the labor controversy
had not been pending.”100 Finally, the Court held that even if the employees’
distribution of the handbills had constituted a concerted activity, they were
still barred from receiving protected status because the nature of their
conduct conflicted with the purpose of the NLRA.101
4. Valley Hospital Medical Center, Inc.: Introducing Online
Communication to the Canon of Protected Concerted Activity
Cases, But Just Barely
The 2007 case of Valley Hospital Medical Center, Inc.102 is the most
recent decision that the Board has relied on in analyzing current social media
cases.103 Here, the Board determined that an employee’s statements on a
website relating to the terms and conditions of her employment constituted a
concerted activity, and as such, the employer’s decision to discipline her in
response to those protected statements was unlawful.104 The employee, a
nurse, wrote an article published on the union’s website in which she
criticized the employer hospital’s policies and discussed staffing level
problems that negatively impacted the nurses’ ability to perform their jobs
(as well as compromised patients’ health).105 The hospital suspended the
employee following publication of the online article.106 On review, the

100. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 477.
101. Id. at 477–78. The Court cites to, among other decisions, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257 (1939) (“[T]he fundamental policy of the Act is to safeguard the rights of
self-organization and collective bargaining, and thus by the promotion of industrial peace to remove
obstructions to the free flow of commerce as defined in the Act.”). Thus in Jefferson Standard, the
technicians’ conduct was apparently held to be disloyal or reckless enough to go against the
principles contained in the Act, therefore causing the employees to lose protection.
102. 351 N.L.R.B. 1250 (2007), enforced sub nom. Nev. Serv. Emps. Union, Local 1107 v.
NLRB, 358 F. App’x 783 (9th Cir. 2009).
103. See infra note 143.
104. Valley Hosp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 1252–54. In its current analysis of social media cases, the
Board asserts that Valley Hospital stands for the proposition that a finding of protected activity does
not change if employee statements are communicated via the Internet. NLRB, OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL
CONCERNING
SOCIAL
MEDIA
CASES,
4
(Aug.
18,
2011),
available
at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e743 [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OM 1174].
105. Valley Hosp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 1252–54. The employee made two other public statements
against her employer, and the Board addressed them as well in its decision. Id. First, she made
comments at a union press conference while the parties were involved in negotiations regarding
staffing levels, and the comments were published in a newspaper article. Id. at 1250. Second, she
distributed a flyer in which she was quoted as saying she was suspended for standing up with her
coworkers against management. Id. at 1251. The Board determined that, in addition to her online
article, these two statements were also protected concerted activities, and the hospital was therefore
prohibited from engaging in an adverse employment action against her. Id. at 1254.
106. Id. at 1251.
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Board held that her statements “clearly were related to the ongoing labor
dispute over staffing” because they were made on the union’s website the
day after a union rally took place that addressed staffing levels.107 There was
no evidence that the online statements were disloyal or maliciously false,
which would therefore forfeit protection under the NLRA.108 Thus, as long
as protected concerted activity “is not unlawful, violent, in breach of
contract, or disloyal,” employees who engage in such activity will not lose
protection under the Act “simply because their activity contravenes an
employer’s rule or policies.”109
5. Mushroom Transportation Company: Mere Griping Is Not Enough to
Deserve Protection
The case of Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB110 also provides a
helpful illustration of the limits on protected speech under the Act. In this
case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that simply griping over
employment conditions between two employees is not concerted activity.111
The employee whose conduct was in question had a regular “habit” of
talking to his coworkers and discussing their rights, and he was later
terminated.112 The court held that just because the employee’s conversations
related to the interests of other employees, this was not enough to grant the
speech protection under the NLRA, as his conversations were not part of a
broader attempt to take action alongside his coworkers.113 Rather, the court
elucidated the proper test, stating, “Activity which consists of mere talk
must, in order to be protected, be talk looking toward group action,” and if
the conversation fails to meet this criterion, “it is more than likely to be mere
‘griping.’”114

107. Id. at 1253.
108. Id. “[T]hese statements were intended not to disparage or harm [Valley Hospital] but to
pressure [it] to increase staffing and thereby improve nurses’ working conditions.” Id.
109. Id. at 1254 (citing Commc’ns Workers of Am., Local 9509, 303 N.L.R.B. 264, 272 (1991)).
Additionally, employers may not interfere with their employees’ right to engage in concerted
activities by mandating some specific internal process for expressing work-related concerns. Id.
110. 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
111. Id. at 685.
112. Id. at 684. The employee’s conversations dealt primarily with holiday pay, vacations, and
employer practices regarding work assignments. Id. The court looked “in vain” for evidence
showing that the employee’s conversations related to “any effort[s] . . . to initiate or promote any
concerted action to do anything[.]” Id. at 684–85.
113. Id. at 685.
114. Id. “[I]t must appear at the very least that [a conversation] was engaged in with the object of
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B. Standards for Employers’ Social Media Policies
Today, forty percent of employers have a formal social media policy.115
Employers may violate Section 8(a)(1)116 of the NLRA by simply
maintaining improper work rules, even if they do not enforce them.117 It is
important for employers to craft lawful and effective social media policies in
order to avoid any potential liability before the NLRB.118 A two-step inquiry
governs whether the maintenance of a rule violates the NLRA.119 First, if the
rule explicitly restricts Section 7 protected activities, it is unlawful.120
Second, if the rule does not explicitly restrict protected activities, then it will
only violate Section 8(a)(1) if it is shown that: “(1) employees would
reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule
was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been
applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.”121
The NLRB held that the above inquiry must begin with a reasonable
reading of the rule in question, and it cautioned against “reading particular
phrases in isolation.”122 The Board will not find a violation simply because a
policy could possibly be understood to restrict protected activity.123 Rather,
context is key—it provides the best indication as to the reasonableness of a
particular construction.124 Take, for example, a rule proscribing “negative
conversations” about managers, which was contained in a list of policies
regarding working conditions and contained no further clarification or

initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group action in the
interest of the employees.” Id.
115. SHRM Survey: More than Half of Employers Will Increase Social Media Outreach in 2012,
SOC’Y
FOR
HUM.
RESOURCE
MGMT.
(Jan.
12,
2012),
http://www.shrm.org/about/pressroom/PressReleases/Pages/SHRMSurveyincreaseSocialMedia2012.
aspx.
116. “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7] . . . .” National Labor Relations Act
§ 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
117. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998).
118. See Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, slip op. at 1 (Sept. 7, 2012) (stating that
the employer “violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a rule prohibiting employees from
electronically posting statements that ‘damage the Company . . . or damage any person’s
reputation.’”).
119. See Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646–47 (2004).
120. Id. at 646.
121. Id. at 647.
122. Id. at 646.
123. Id. at 647 (“[W]e will not conclude that a reasonable employee would read the rule to apply
to such activity simply because the rule could be interpreted that way.”); see also Fiesta Hotel Corp.,
344 N.L.R.B. 1363, 1368 (2005) (“We are simply unwilling to engage in such speculation in order to
condemn as unlawful a facially neutral workrule that is not aimed at Section 7 activity and was
neither adopted in response to such activity nor enforced against it.”).
124. See Martin Luther Mem’l Home, 343 N.L.R.B. at 647.
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examples.125 This rule was determined to be unlawful because of its
potential chilling effect on Section 7 protected activity; in the absence of
further guidance from the employer, an employee could reasonably interpret
the policy to limit his right to protected speech.126
By contrast, the Board stated that a rule forbidding “statements which
are slanderous or detrimental to the company,” which appeared on a list of
other prohibited conduct such as “sexual or racial harassment” and
“sabotage,” could not be reasonably understood to restrict protected
activity.127 There, the Board determined that because the rule appeared
alongside examples of harmful misconduct, “employees would not
reasonably believe that the . . . rule applie[d] to statements protected by the
Act.”128
C. Summary of Rules Regarding Concerted Activity
Under Board precedent, therefore, concerted activity is a collective
endeavor “engaged in with or on the authority of other employees” for the
purpose of advancing group interests.129 Individualized efforts undertaken
“solely by and on behalf of the employee himself” do not meet the threshold
for concerted activity.130 A communication must also relate to an ongoing
labor dispute in order to be concerted.131 Employees who engage in
concerted activity may still lose the protections of the Act if their conduct is
sufficiently opprobrious, reckless, disloyal, or maliciously false.132 Mere
griping does not, on its own, amount to concerted activity.133
As to employer policies, the NLRA prohibits employers from retaliating
against employees who engage in protected concerted activity.134 Overbroad

125. KSL Claremont Resort, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 836 (2005).
126. Id. at 832.
127. Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462 (2002).
128. Id. On May 30, 2012, the NLRB Office of the General Counsel issued Memorandum OM
12-59, which included a sample social media policy that the NRLB found did not violate the NLRA.
NLRB, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (May 30, 2012), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OM 1259].
129. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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social media policies that explicitly restrict protected activity—or that can be
reasonably understood to do so—are unlawful.135
III. TRYING TO FIT A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE: THE BOARD’S
MISAPPLICATION OF DATED PRECEDENT TO CURRENT SOCIAL MEDIA CASES
The Board’s Office of the General Counsel regularly issues “periodic
reports of cases raising significant legal or policy issues.”136 On August 18,
2011; January 24, 2012; and May 30, 2012; the Office issued memoranda on
case developments involving social media.137 The reports, which describe
recent decisions concerning social media, provide guidance as to the Board’s
current position on what types of communications constitute protected
concerted activities under the NLRA.138 The following provides descriptions
of a few selected cases from the memoranda that were most helpful in
clarifying the Board’s views on concerted speech.
A. Hispanics United139
In this case, an employee posted on Facebook that one of her coworkers,
Cruz-Moore, was criticizing the job performance of their fellow
employees.140 The employee’s Facebook post also asked coworkers how
they felt about the situation, and four employees subsequently responded to
the post.141 The next day at work, the employer fired the employee who
wrote the initial Facebook post as well as the four employees who
responded.142
The Board ultimately determined that the employees’ statements on
Facebook constituted concerted activity under the Meyers standard,
regardless of the fact that the activity took place on a social network

135. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
136. MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 104, at 2.
137. See id.; NLRB, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM OM 12-31, REPORT OF
THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (Jan. 24, 2012), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567 [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OM 1231]; MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, supra note 128.
138. See
generally
Operations-Management
Memos,
NLRB,
http://nlrb.gov/publications/operations-management-memos (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
139. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012).
140. Id. slip op. at 7.
141. Id. slip op. at 7–8. The Facebook post that started the conversation read, “Lydia Cruz, a
coworker feels that we don’t help our clients enough at HUB I about had it! My fellow coworkers
how do [you] feel?” Id. slip op. at 7. Several employees posted responses, including the following:
“What the f. . . . Try doing my job I have [five] programs”; “What the Hell, we don’t have a life as
is, What else can we do???”; “Tell her to come do [my f—-ing job and see] if I don’t do enough, this
is just dum[b].” Id.
142. Id. slip op. at 8.
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platform.143 The Board reasoned that the employee who made the first
Facebook post was appealing to her coworkers for assistance, and that
because their discussions related to job performance and staffing level issues
in preparation for a meeting with the Executive Director, all of the five
employees’ statements were protected under the Act.144 The Board stated
that the employees were “taking a first step towards taking group action to
defend themselves against the accusations they could reasonably believe
Cruz-Moore was going to make to management.”145 Further, the Board
noted that protection under Section 7 “does not depend on whether
organizing activity was ongoing,” nor on “whether the employees herein had
brought their concerns to management before they were fired, or that there is
no express evidence that they intended to take further action, or that they
were not attempting to change any of their working conditions.”146
Moreover, the employees’ postings were not “opprobrious” under the
Atlantic Steel test so as to lose the Act’s protection.147

143. Id. slip op. at 8–10. In its memorandum describing Hispanics United, the NLRB Office of
the General Counsel cited Valley Hospital for the proposition that a “finding of protected activity
does not change if employee statements were communicated via the internet.” MEMORANDUM OM
11-74, supra note 104, at 4.
144. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, slip op. at 9–10. The Board thus interpreted the
instigating employee’s question (“My fellow coworkers, how do [you] feel?”) as a call for
assistance, even though the employee failed to propose a course of action or remedy to the problem.
See id.
145. Id. slip op. at 9. This argument seems attenuated at best. The facts show minimal evidence
of any intent to participate in group efforts to address working conditions. If anything, this is a case
of mere griping; under Mushroom, such behavior is not protected concerted activity under the
NLRA. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
146. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, slip op. at 9 (emphasis added). Here, the Board’s
analysis seems to fly in the face of Meyers, which specifically required some sort of group action in
order for activity to be protected under the Act. See supra notes 66–81 and accompanying text.
147. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, slip op. at 9–10. The case is especially disturbing
because the Board appears to be protecting cyber-bullying in the employment context under the
guise of upholding concerted activity. Cyber-bullying is a growing concern in the workplace, and
this aggressive behavior is damaging to both employees and to corporate culture. See Anita
Bruzzese, Workplace Becomes New Schoolyard for Bullies, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/jobcenter/workplace/bruzzese/story/2011/08/Workplace-becomesnew-schoolyard-for-bullies/50081460/1. When the employees in Hispanics United engaged in a
targeted discussion on Facebook concerning Cruz-Moore, using both expletives and an arguably
threatening tone, they essentially ganged up on her while on the job.
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B. Collections Agency148
Here, the Board found that an employee at a collections agency was
engaged in protected concerted activity when she posted a Facebook status
update to her wall, including expletives, saying that her employer had
“messed up” by transferring her to another department and “that she was
done with being a good employee.”149 The employee was Facebook friends
with several of her coworkers; one coworker responded and said she was
“right behind” the employee.150 Another coworker put forth a similar
affirmation, and a few former employees also chimed in about
management.151 One former coworker suggested filing a class action
lawsuit.152 The employer later discharged the employee for her Facebook
comments.153
The Board concluded that the employee’s Facebook statement, as well
as the ensuing conversation it created, involved complaints about working
conditions because the conversation related to a job transfer.154 Further, the
Board determined that the activity encompassed employees’ initiation of
group action; specifically, the Board interpreted the former coworker’s
statement concerning a class action lawsuit to refer to participating in group
activity.155 Based on these two considerations, the Board determined that the

148. MEMORANDUM OM 12-31, supra note 137, at 3–6.
149. Id. at 3.
150. Id. at 4.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 5.
155. Id. The Board applies its precedent too liberally here, as it appears the employee was simply
complaining and not calling for group action. Arguably, if the employee was the one who
mentioned a class action lawsuit from the outset, that might constitute a collective solicitation to
improve working conditions. However, her initial post merely said that she was done with being a
good employee, which seems individualized and self-serving and thus outside the scope of Meyers.
See supra notes 66–81 and accompanying text.
In a complete departure from the type of analysis found in the Collections Agency case,
however, the Board indicated earlier in its August 2011 Memorandum that very similar behavior by
an employee at a retail store was not concerted activity. See MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note
104, at 17. The employee posted a profane comment on Facebook complaining about the “tyranny”
at the store and suggested that the employer would get a wakeup call. Id. Several coworkers
responded to his comment and expressed support. Id. The employee wrote back that the Assistant
Manager was being a “super mega puta” (“puta” is Spanish for prostitute). Id. When the employer
fired the employee, the Board upheld the termination, saying that the employee’s postings were
merely an expression of “individual gripe,” and that they contained “no language suggesting that the
employee sought to initiate or induce coworkers to engage in group action; rather they expressed
only his frustration regarding his individual dispute with the Assistant Manager.” Id. This
interpretation of the case seems entirely accurate. However, it is unclear why the Board did not
adopt the very same reasoning in the Collections Agency case.
Such inconsistency in the Board’s analysis from one social media case to the next may be
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employee’s communications were protected concerted activity under the
NLRA.156
C. Karl Knauz Motors157
In this case, the Board ruled that where the employee Becker, a
salesperson at a BMW dealership, posted photographs and commentary
criticizing his employer’s sales event on his Facebook page, the posts were
part of a protected activity.158 Specifically, Becker posted photographs of
the food and beverages served at a major sales event, as well as images of
his coworkers posing next to the food and a large banner advertising the new
car model.159 Becker also posted the following remark:
I was happy to see that Knauz went “All Out” for the most
important launch of a new BMW in years . . . . A car that will
generate tens [of] millions of dollars in revenues for Knauz over the
next few years. The small 8 oz bags of chips, and the $2.00 cookie
plate from Sam’s Club, and the semi fresh apples and oranges were
such a nice touch . . . but to top it all off. . .the Hot Dog Cart.
Where our clients could attain a[n] over[-]cooked wiener and a stale
bun[].160

partially due to the fact that the issue is young; however, the Board’s approach is no less confusing,
and it should modify its analysis so that practitioners, employees, and employers alike can have a
clear idea as to the Board’s position on concerted activity in the social media realm. See infra notes
176–253 and accompanying text.
156. MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 104, at 5. Another case in the August 2011
Memorandum illustrates employee conduct that does not qualify as concerted under the NLRA. Id.
at 16–17. Here, an employee at a nonprofit facility for the homeless was working the overnight shift
when she had a conversation on her Facebook wall with two Facebook friends, neither of whom
were her coworkers. Id. at 16. She posted that it was spooky being alone at night at a mental
institution, that one client was cracking her up, and that she “did not know whether the client was
laughing at her, with her, or at the client’s own voices.” Id. The employer discovered the
employee’s posts and promptly terminated her. Id. The Board upheld the termination under Meyers
because the employee’s conversation did not involve any of her coworkers, nor did she seek to
induce or prepare for any group action. Id. at 16–17. Incidentally (though the Board did not address
this possibility), even if the employee had engaged in the same online conversation with her
coworkers, the fact that she was making fun of individuals suffering from mental illness would seem
to render her conduct so opprobrious as to lose protection under the Act. See supra notes 82–91 and
accompanying text.
157. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (Sept. 28, 2012).
158. Id. slip op. at 6–7, 12.
159. Id. slip op. at 7.
160. Id.
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The dealership fired the employee upon discovering the Facebook
posts.161
The Board concluded that, under Meyers, Becker engaged in concerted
activity when he posted his comments and photographs regarding the sales
event.162 The Board reasoned that Becker expressed the sentiment of the
group by voicing the salespersons’ disappointment in the dealership (prior to
the sales event, the employees informed management they were not happy
with the choice of refreshments).163 Further, the Board ruled that the
concerted activity was related to the employees’ terms and conditions of
employment, as the salespersons were paid entirely on commission and were
concerned about the impact the employer’s choice of refreshments would
have on sales, and thus, their commissions.164 Finally, the Board found that
the employee’s activity was not so opprobrious as to lose NLRA
protection.165
D. Triple Play166
Here, the employer, a sports bar and restaurant, fired two employees
who took part in a Facebook conversation initiated by a former coworker
about the employer’s tax-withholding policy.167 When several of the
restaurant’s former and current employees discovered that they owed state
income taxes related to their earnings at the restaurant, at least one employee
raised the issue with the employer, and a staff meeting was arranged to
address the issue.168 Thereafter, a former employee posted a statement and a
shorthand expletive on her Facebook page expressing dissatisfaction at
owing the taxes and stating that the employer’s owners could not even do
paperwork correctly.169 Another employee “Liked” her post; in addition,
three other employees commented, and one referred to mentioning to the

161. Id. slip op. at 8. The dealership also fired Becker for posting photos involving a car accident
online; however, that involves a separate analysis from the issue here. Id. slip op. at 9.
162. Id. slip op. at 10.
163. Id. The Board noted that the employee told his coworkers he would put the photographs on
Facebook, and it interpreted this to mean that the employee was speaking on all of their behalf. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Three D, L.L.C. (Triple Play), JD(NY)–01–12, Case No. 34-CA-12915 (NLRB Jan. 3,
2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/34-CA-012915.
167. Id. at 2–3. From the outset, the fact that a former employee—and not a current employee—
initiated the conversation suggests that the purpose was to gripe, and not to improve terms of
employment; a former employee no longer has an interest in improving working conditions at the
company.
168. Id. at 3, 8.
169. Id. at 3.
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employer that they would discuss the matter at the meeting.170 Several of the
employer’s customers also joined in on the conversation.171
The Board determined that the Facebook conversation related to
employees’ mutual concerns about the employer’s administration of income
tax withholdings, which is a term and condition of employment.172
Additionally, the Board highlighted that the conversation “contemplated
future group activity,” as one of the employees mentioned that she had
requested the matter be discussed at an upcoming management meeting.173
With respect to one employee’s use of the Facebook “Like” button, the
Board stated that it “constituted participation in the discussion that was
sufficiently meaningful as to rise to the level of concerted activity.”174 Based
on these considerations, the Board therefore deemed the activity both
concerted and protected under the Meyers standard.175

170. Id. at 3–4.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 8.
173. See id.; MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 104, at 10.
174. Triple Play, JD(NY)–01–12 at 8–9. The Board went on to state that the employee’s
selection of the “Like” option amounted to, “in the context of Facebook communications, an assent
to the comments being made, and a meaningful contribution to the discussion.” Id. Here, the Board
attributes much more weight to a simple click of a button than the action deserves. Furthermore, the
Board ignores how easy it is to “Like” a post on Facebook; the gesture has very little in common
with actually banding together with a fellow employee at work and joining in his cause. Moreover,
it is difficult to deduce a person’s intent from a simple Facebook “Like,” let alone from his or her
wall posts and status updates. For the Board to elevate a “Like” to the level of “meaningful
contribution to the discussion” seems forced and artificial within the context of concerted activity.
See infra Part IV.B.
The Board’s position is especially interesting in light of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia’s recent decision in April 2012 that a Facebook “Like” is not
constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment:
Simply liking a Facebook page is insufficient. It is not the kind of substantive statement
that has previously warranted constitutional protection. The Court will not attempt to
infer the actual content of [a plaintiff’s] posts from one click of a button on [a] Facebook
page. For the Court to assume that the Plaintiffs made some specific statement without
evidence of such statements is improper. Facebook posts can be considered matters of
public concern; however, the Court does not believe Plaintiffs . . . have alleged sufficient
speech to garner First Amendment protection.
Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (E.D. Va. 2012). It is surprising that a federal court
would offer less protection—and under a broader standard—to Facebook “Likes” than the NLRB
would under the narrower NLRA.
175. Triple Play, JD(NY)–01–12 at 8–9.
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IV. SOCIAL MEDIA AS A CATEGORY ALL ITS OWN: THE INADEQUACY OF
TRADITIONAL TESTS, AND WHAT MAKES SOCIAL MEDIA DIFFERENT FROM
THE PROVERBIAL WATER COOLER
The Board is misguided when it broadly asserts that communication
over the Internet does nothing to alter a finding of protected activity.176 Not
all Internet speech shares the same qualities.177 An email conversation
between coworkers or an article appearing on a union website178 is markedly
different from an employee’s rant about his boss on Facebook.179 The
Board’s unwavering adherence to dated law and failure to recognize the
uniqueness of social media communication not only hinders its interpretation
of current cases, it also makes it more difficult to break away from
backward-looking precedent in the future.180
A. The Public Factor: Acknowledging the Omnipresent Audience Built into
Social Media Websites
The principal aspect of social media communication that makes it
different from traditional face-to-face interaction at the company water
cooler181 is its public nature.182 Indeed, sites like Facebook and Twitter have
paved the way in diminishing the modern concept of privacy, especially
among younger generations who have grown up with the Internet.183
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg claims that privacy is no longer a
“social norm” and that people are now comfortable “not only sharing more
information and different kinds, but more openly and with more people.”184

176. See MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 104, at 4.
177. See infra Part IV.A–B.
178. Arguably, these two examples could comport nicely with the Board’s view that Internet
speech deserves the same analysis as anything else, because they do not contain the public element
of social media websites. See infra Part IV.A–B.
179. See infra Part IV.A–B.
180. See infra notes 233–53.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 35–36.
182. See Sprague, supra note 17, at 396–97.
183. See id.; see generally Catharine P. Taylor, Facebook Oversharing Clogs the Feed, SOC.
MEDIA
INSIDER
(Jan.
26,
2012,
1:22
PM),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/166621/facebook-oversharing-clogs-the-feed.html.
184. Emma Barnett, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg Says Privacy is No Longer a ‘Social Norm,’
THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/6966628/Face
books-Mark-Zuckerberg-says-privacy-is-no-longer-a-social-norm.html.
At the same time, however, some level of privacy protection is critical to the success of
social media giants, as indicated by Facebook’s February 2012 filing with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission to sell its stock to the public. Mark Milian, What scares
Facebook:
Privacy
and
Phones,
CNN
(Feb.
1,
2012,
5:36
AM),
http://cnn.com/2012/02/01/tech/social-media/facebook-ipo-risks/index.html. In its initial public
offering registration, Facebook listed users’ concerns regarding privacy as a risk to business because
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On Twitter, for example, a user’s “tweets” are visible either to everyone who
visits the profile page (if the account is public) or to all of the user’s
followers (if the account is protected).185 Likewise, when an individual
creates a status update or wall post on Facebook, it is customary for all of
her “friends”—whether they be close friends, acquaintances, distant
classmates, or her mother and father—to have access to it.186 In November
2011, the average Facebook user had 190 friends.187 With the single click of
a button, then, social media users are able to broadcast statements, images,
links, and videos to hundreds, if not thousands, of people instantaneously.188
This omnipresent public audience is precisely what renders social media
a category all of its own, separate from the traditional work environment
addressed by the NLRA.189 Meyers—the leading test for the Board’s
concerted activity analysis—focused on the importance of employees
communicating directly with one another for an activity to be protected
under the NLRA.190 But when it comes to employee communications via

it could cause users to temper their use of the website. Id. Facebook cited the mishandling of user
information as its primary concern (i.e., improper disclosure of personal data or hacker activity). Id.
Although information security breaches are a far cry from the subject of this article, the fact that
Facebook identifies a direct relationship between its finances and users’ privacy concerns
demonstrates that individuals across the globe do in fact have some basic expectation of privacy in
the digital age. Id. This, in itself, is noteworthy: in November 2011, a district court decision held
that Twitter users had no expectation of privacy in their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses as collected
and stored by Twitter, and that even if they did, the users forfeited that expectation when they
voluntarily disclosed the information to third parties in order to access Twitter. In re Application of
the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 131–33 (E.D. Va.
2011); see generally Kevin Poulsen, Judge Rules Feds Can Have WikiLeaks Associates’ Twitter
Data, WIRED.COM (Nov. 10, 2011, 2:23 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/11/wikileakstwitter-ruling/.
185. About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/14016 (last
visited Mar. 24, 2013). The default account setting for Tweets is public. Id.
186. Facebook provides customizable privacy settings, whereby the user can choose to make all
posts public—meaning they are visible even to non-Facebook users—or to restrict certain content so
that only specified persons or groups can see it. Data Use Policy—Sharing and Finding You on
Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-on-fb (last visited Mar.
24, 2013). For purposes of this article, however, assume that the typical Facebook user allows all of
his or her friends to see content posted on a wall or news feed.
187. Lars Backstrom, Anatomy of Facebook, FACEBOOK (Nov. 21, 2011, 5:04 PM),
https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150388519243859. The median friend count was
100. Id. Though Backstrom noted that the median figure “may seem surprisingly low” because “a
quick survey of [his] own friends reveals that they almost all have more than 100” connections, this
is the result of a “classic paradox regarding social networks” whereby “for most people, the median
friend count of their friends is higher than their own friend count.” Id.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 186–87.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 191–208.
190. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984).
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social media, third parties (i.e., non-employees) can become just as
involved—if not more—in the conversation, and this has a significant
impact on the employer–employee relationship.191
Social media builds third parties into every communication by providing
a constant group of listeners who can participate in the dialogue as they
This is significantly different from a standard workplace
wish.192
environment.193 When an employee posts a negative statement about his
employer on a social media website, he reaches a far greater number of
viewers than if he makes the same comment verbally at the office.194 He
also reaches a more diverse group of people, many of whom are likely not
his fellow coworkers.195 Customers, competitors, and members of the
community alike may be able to see the employee’s statement.196 From an
employer’s perspective, then, social media can injure the company’s
interests more swiftly and severely than traditional forms of discourse
because of the widespread nature of the communication.197

191. See infra notes 254–66 and accompanying text.
192. See Daniel Flamberg, The Psychology of Facebook, IMEDIA CONNECTION (Feb. 7, 2012,
3:17
PM),
http://blogs.imediaconnection.com/blog/2012/02/07/the-psychology-of-facebook/.
Flamberg writes, “Facebook means you never have to be alone. Facebook insures you always have
someone to talk to and something to see and react to.” Id.
193. See infra notes 254–66 and accompanying text.
194. See Sprague, supra note 17, at 417.
195. See Adam D. I. Kramer, Connecting with. . . Sam Gosling: Facebook Psychologist, THE
FACEBOOK
BLOG
(Feb.
2,
2010,
12:56
PM),
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=283497147130. In this way, social media converges the
workplace realm with that of home life and recreation. Dr. Sam Gosling, a psychologist and
professor who has researched social media expression, asserts that as new technologies emerge,
individuals are bringing their distinct identities—i.e., the “home or family self, a friend self, a leisure
self, a work self”—together via online social networking. Id. He states:
On my Facebook profile, I have colleagues, I have family members, I have students, I
have people who’ve read my book, I have all kinds of different people there and it’s
much harder now to maintain that separation. So I think one of the things we are being
forced to do is accept the merging of identities that we may have tried to keep apart
before.
Id.
196. See id.
197. It could be argued that because standard print publication bears some similarity to social
media websites in terms of scope of readership, social media does not deserve its own separate
analysis. See generally Adam Clark Estes, New York Times Print Circulation Rises, Sort of, THE
ATLANTIC WIRE (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/business/2011/11/new-york-timesprint-circulation-rises-sort-of/44392/ (stating that the circulation of the New York Times as of
September 2011 hovered at 992,383). It is certainly true that a print newspaper may have a greater
number of readers than hypothetical employee John Smith’s Facebook wall. However, the
difference between the two media is the type of content generated by each one. The newspaper has a
process behind it that involves approval for publication, edits, review, etc., so that an employee rant
would generally not take up the front-page headline. John Smith, on the other hand, can get home
after a day of work, log onto his Facebook account, and publicly accuse his boss of being a terrible
manager or his company of being discriminatory. His every post is essentially a leading headline.
As long as another one of Smith’s coworkers chimes into the online conversation (which purportedly

1028

04 FERRALL SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[Vol. 40: 1001, 2013]

5/15/13 8:24 PM

Concerted Activity and Social Media
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

One additional consequence of social media’s public nature is that any
and all statements made online are permanent.198 Users’ profile pages on
social media websites contain a record of everything the individual ever said
or did on the site.199 Again, this can be more harmful for employers; an
employee’s passing remark about his supervisor in the hallway may fade
into the ether, but if he makes that same comment on the Internet, it is
memorialized on-screen and forever searchable by individuals in his online
social network.200
Although print publications such as magazines,
pamphlets, and newspapers all share this quality, the difference is in the
accessibility of the material.201 It is much easier to click through a person’s
profile page to see what she said about her company back in August of 2006
than it is to sift through stacks of archives in a library.202
Even if employees’ rants about their employers on social media
websites are determined to constitute concerted activity, the Board has
misapplied its precedent, as both Atlantic Steel and Jefferson Standard
suggest that such conduct is still unprotected.203 First, under the Atlantic
Steel factors for determining whether an employee has forfeited protection
under the NLRA, the first thing to consider is the place of the discussion.204
The Board decided Atlantic Steel in 1979, long before the days of the
Internet, when it could not have imagined the term “place” to mean an
online social network.205 Regardless, the Board today insists that the
character of an employee’s speech does not change whether it takes place in

changes it from individual to group action), this activity counts as protected under current NLRB
analysis.
198. Sarah Worsham, Social Media is Your Permanent Record, SAZBEAN (Sept. 22, 2010),
http://sazbean.com/2010/09/22/social-media-is-your-permanent-record/.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. Although posts may decrease in popularity the longer they are online, making them arguably
less injurious to an employer over time, the fact that individuals can still retrieve the information
relatively easily is the distinguishing element. See Pamela Vaughan, Shelf Life of Social Media
Links
Only
3
Hours,
HUBSPOT
BLOG
(Sept.
8,
2011,
8:00
AM),
http://blog.hubspot.com/blog/tabid/6307/bid/24507/Shelf-Life-of-Social-Media-Links-Only-3Hours-Data.aspx. This is especially true with Facebook’s “Timeline,” which organizes users’ wall
posts, photos, and other activity by date and makes old information even more readily accessible.
See Introducing Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/467610326601639/ (last
visited Mar. 24, 2013).
203. See supra notes 87–100 and accompanying text.
204. Atl. Steel, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).
205. Id. at 814.
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the office or on Facebook.206 Based on the discussion above regarding the
exceedingly public nature of social media websites, however, the place
factor in the Atlantic Steel analysis takes on a more important meaning than
the Board acknowledges.207 Thus, when a discussion occurs on a social
media website where third-party viewers can see it, the place factor should
always weigh heavily in favor of the employer.208
Second, in Jefferson Standard, the Supreme Court emphasized that
employee appeals to third parties will only remain protected if the
communication relates to an ongoing labor dispute and is not so disloyal,
reckless, or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protections.209 As applied
to social media cases, this requires the employee to adequately identify that
his comments are related to a pending labor dispute.210 Additionally, and
perhaps most importantly, the employee’s statement must be in line with the
purposes of the Act: to “promot[e] industrial peace and stability.”211 In
Jefferson Standard, the Court deemed workers’ public distribution of
handbills containing disparaging remarks against their employer disloyal
enough to go against the purpose of the Act and to lose its protection.212
Given the Court’s disfavor toward involving third parties in the
conversation, employees who attack their employers on social media
websites in full view of third-party readers should likewise forfeit protection
under the NLRA.213 The NLRB has thus failed to appropriately apply both
Atlantic Steel and Jefferson Standard to recent social media cases by
maintaining protected status for online speech that is both public and
widespread.214
B. The Intent Factor: Who Are You Talking to, and Why?
Another important aspect of social media communication that makes it
different from the company water cooler is the employee’s intent behind his
statements.215 Meyers contemplated the need for an employee to involve his

206. MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 104, at 4.
207. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
209. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. 464, 473–75 (1953).
210. See id. at 474–75. Thus, for a worker to come home at the end of the day and voice
generalized complaints about his supervisor or company practices should not be protected. See id.
In Jefferson Standard, it was not enough that the timing of the disparaging handbills coincided with
a labor dispute. Id. at 476. The employees needed to properly disclose both the context and reasons
behind the handbill distribution. Id. at 476–77.
211. Id. at 476
212. Id. at 472–75.
213. See id. at 472–77.
214. See supra notes 136–75 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 184.
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fellow employees in discussions about work in order for speech to be a
protected concerted activity under the NLRA.216 Indeed, when employees
gather together to discuss the workplace, we can infer that they intend to talk
specifically with one another.217 However, with sites such as Facebook and
Twitter, an employee need not intend to communicate with anyone in
particular when he posts a rant on his status update about the workday; he
speaks to no one and yet speaks to everyone.218 Statements on social media
websites extend very broadly, and individuals can never be sure as to how
many friends—if any—will comment on or respond to a particular post. If a
conversation ensues between coworkers, it may be merely incidental.219
Surely, employees who publish negative statements about their
employers online are intending to communicate with someone.220 But given
the nature of social media websites, it is unlikely that employees’ primary
intent when they post bad things about their company online is to band
together with coworkers and discuss the terms of their employment. This
does not seem to be the type of situation that Meyers addressed.221 Meyers
presented two possible categories for employee conduct: activity that is
either “engaged in with or on the authority of other employees” or carried
out “by and on behalf of the employee himself.”222 Using the facts from
AMR as an example, where Souza called her boss a scumbag on Facebook,223
such communication does not fit neatly within either of the Meyers
classifications. At first glance, Souza’s statement may seem like group
activity, in that she conversed with her fellow employees about her boss
after they responded to her post.224 But at the same time, Souza in no way
directed her words toward her fellow coworkers; rather, she made a
statement to all of her Facebook friends, which resembles individual activity

216. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984).
217. See id.
218. See Flamberg, supra note 192.
219. Under current Board analysis, though, when a coworker responds to an employee’s post
about work, the conversation almost always automatically constitutes protected concerted activity.
See supra notes 136–75 and accompanying text.
220. It is difficult to argue that by posting something in a public online forum, an individual
intends not to communicate anything to anyone. See Flamberg, supra note 192. If a person really
wishes to keep her thoughts to herself, she presumably does not choose to broadcast them over the
Internet. See id.
221. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
222. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497.
223. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28.
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carried out on her own behalf.225 Thus, because Meyers does not address the
distinct nature of employees’ social media communication, the Board should
not rely on it in determining whether the activity is protected concerted
activity under the NLRA. Moreover, even if Meyers applies, employee
complaints on social media websites are much more akin to activity focusing
on individual rather than group interests, and as such, they are
unprotected.226
Finally, employees’ intent in posting rants on Facebook also goes to the
griping rule laid down in Mushroom Transportation—namely, that mere
griping is not protected under the NLRA.227 It appears that much of the
negative communication posted to social media websites simply amounts to
griping, and for the NLRB to elevate such talk to the level of protected
discourse is inappropriate. Take, for example, Hispanics United, where the
employee posted on Facebook that one of her coworkers was criticizing her
coworkers’ job performance.228 She seemed to intend to complain and vent
to anyone who would listen rather than to initiate group action among her
coworkers.229 Likewise, in Triple Play, where a former employee posted an
expletive on Facebook stating that the employer’s owners could not do
paperwork correctly, was she really seeking to address working conditions
on behalf of her old coworkers?230 This is unlikely because her publication
more closely resembles the comments made in Mushroom Transportation.231
There, the court held that even though the employee’s statements related to
shared concerns among his coworkers, he did not seek to initiate group
action when he spoke and, therefore, engaged in mere griping.232 The Board
has thus failed to heed its own rules by ignoring the standards set forth in
Mushroom Transportation and by hastily concluding that the Act protects
just about anything said between coworkers—even when what is said has no
relationship to group activity.

225. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28.
226. See supra notes 66–81 and accompanying text.
227. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 684 (3d Cir. 1964).
228. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, slip op. at 7 (Dec. 14, 2012).
229. See id. Such behavior is also quite damaging to the individual’s fellow employees, i.e., the
ones who are being griped about on Facebook. See supra notes 139–45. This further supports the
argument that the activity should not rise to the level of protection offered under the NLRA.
230. Triple Play, JD(NY)–01–12, Case No. 34-CA-12915, at 3 (NLRB Jan. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/34-CA-012915. The fact that the individual was a former employee, and
not a current employee, only strengthens the argument that she was merely complaining rather than
trying to band together with people who were no longer her coworkers. See supra notes 148–53.
231. See Mushroom Transp. Co., 330 F.2d at 684.
232. Id. at 685. Here, an employee who repeatedly griped about employment conditions was not
engaged in concerted activity. Id. In order to be protected, “[a]ctivity which consists of mere talk
must . . . be . . . looking toward group action.” Id.
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V. DEVELOPING A NEW FRAMEWORK: PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
A. Shifting the Focus in the Board’s Current Analysis of Online Social
Media Communications
Given the above considerations as to the uniqueness of social media,233
the Board should modify its current analysis of protected concerted activity
when employee speech takes place on social media websites. First, with
respect to the Meyers test, the Board should focus more closely on the
employee’s intent when he posts an online statement.234 Although the
identity of the speakers (i.e., coworkers or third parties) is a certainly an
important consideration, the purpose of the communication is more
indicative of whether the employee acts individually or for the group.235 In
this way, activities will not automatically gain protected status simply
because two or more employees exchange a handful of comments in
response to a Facebook status update.236 If an employee intends to speak to
the whole world, and a short discussion among coworkers ensues, this
should not be considered protected; the employee has not demonstrated the
requisite intent to initiate group action.237
Additionally, the Board should modify its treatment of the first Atlantic
Steel factor—the place of the activity.238 Currently, Board analysis fails to
appropriately reflect the extremely public character of social media speech
and its potential for harming employer interests.239 The place factor should
automatically weigh in favor of the employer any time an employee makes a
statement via social media websites. In this way, the Atlantic Steel test will
acknowledge the public quality of statements made on social networking
sites.240
B. Employers’ Social Media Policies: An Opportunity for Employers to
Create Their Own Social Networks
Under the NLRA, employers can lawfully prohibit employees from

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 219–32 and accompanying text.
Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
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making disparaging remarks about the company via social media, but with a
hefty caveat: they may only do so with regard to unprotected speech.241 In
essence, this means that if an employer can prohibit an employee from
engaging in sexual harassment in the office, it can also prohibit the
employee from making sexually harassing statements on Facebook.242
Granted, this is beneficial in guarding against egregious conduct by
employees. However, it does nothing to help an employer that seeks to
dissuade its employees from posting disparaging remarks about the company
online. The Board has demonstrated a strong commitment to declaring most
social media communication protected, meaning employers cannot restrict
such activity in their policies.243 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the
Board will uphold any social media policies that bar employees from making
negative statements online about management, company practices, or the
employer in general.244
If the Board refuses to permit curtailing employees’ speech on social
media websites, one attractive option for employers is creating their own
social networks for employees only.245 Dubbed “virtual water coolers,”246
these platforms allow employees to create profiles, join groups, send
messages, ask questions, and converse with one another without the
information being exposed to the public.247
These systems offer a solution to many of the issues raised in this
Comment.248 First, they remove the problem of broadcasting employee
speech across the Internet when it has the potential to damage an employer’s
reputation.249 Without third-party viewers watching these conversations on
corporate social networks, employers no longer have to worry about limiting
employee speech to prevent harm to their company’s image.250 Second,
these platforms resolve the problem of identifying individuals’ intent in

241. See supra Part II.B.
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. See supra Part II.B.
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. See, e.g., Debra Donston-Miller, HCL’s Homegrown Social Network Connects 60,000
Employees, INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/thebrainyard/
news/social_networking_private_platforms/232500686;
see
also
Features,
CUBELESS,
http://www.cubeless.com/?page_id=7 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
246. Sarah Worsham, Cubeless—A Virtual Water Cooler, SAZBEAN (July 8, 2008),
http://sazbean.com/2008/07/08/cubeless-a-virtual-water-cooler/.
247. See id. The term “virtual water cooler” is much more appropriate when applied to these
types of websites because the forums are restricted to employees only and thus more closely
resemble the traditional office environment.
248. See supra notes 18–20, 176–232 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
250. See Donston-Miller, supra note 245.
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making statements online.251 Because only employees have access, workers’
participation on the network indicates that they intend to communicate with
their coworkers rather than voice an opinion to the public.252 Finally, the
employer can create rules prohibiting unprotected activities on these
platforms in order to protect employee interests, and such rules will not
violate Section 8(a)(1) under the Act.253
VI. IMPACT: BENEFITING THE EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE ALIKE
Narrowing the scope of what it means to engage in concerted activity on
a social media website is critical for the benefit of workers and businesses
throughout the United States.254 The Board’s trend of declaring that most
employee speech on social media websites constitutes protected concerted
activity is ultimately harmful to both employees and employers.255 On one
hand, though current Board precedent may afford employees greater
freedom on the Internet by allowing them to post freely in the public arena,
such laxity makes employees much more vulnerable to online attacks and
cyber-bullying by coworkers.256 Indeed, in the Hispanics United257 case,
whereby five individuals participated in a Facebook conversation berating
one of their fellow employees, the Board upheld their behavior as protected
concerted activity, meaning the employer could not punish them for it.258
Such a workplace environment is damaging to all parties involved.259
Additionally, employers have strong interests in both maintaining control
and uniformity throughout the workplace and maintaining a desirable online

251. See supra notes 215–32 and accompanying text.
252. See supra text accompanying note 218.
253. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text. It could be argued that this might have the
countereffect of chilling employee speech; for example, if an employee knows that his employer
owns the social network, this could deter him from posting his grievances online. However, the
employer-owned social network does nothing to deter other forms of communication between an
employee and his coworkers outside the network. The fact that an individual employee may choose
to engage in the highest form of workplace protection by not participating in the network and
refusing to voice any of his grievances in a public setting should not be used to suggest that
employers’ provisions regarding social networks actually limit protected activity under the NLRA.
254. See infra notes 255–66 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 136–75 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 147.
257. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012).
258. Id. slip op. at 7–9. The conduct included using expletives and threatening remarks regarding
their coworker. Id. slip op. at 7–8.
259. See id. slip op. at 7–9.
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image.260 The Board’s current path lessens employers’ authority to manage
their employees in a consistent fashion (as seen in Hispanics United) and
compromises their ability to create and foster their own brands on social
media websites.261
The approach set forth in this Comment can temper these concerns by
narrowing the scope of what constitutes concerted activity in the social
media context.262 Removing that shield from employee conduct online will
benefit employees and employers alike.263 First, employees will be protected
from harmful statements or cyber-bullying from their coworkers.264 They
can enjoy consistency in treatment, and no single employee or group of
employees will be allowed to attack others without consequence.265 Second,
employers can regain autonomy over their online presence and not have to
worry about their employees making inappropriate statements that
compromise the identity of the brand or management.266
VII. CONCLUSION
Social networks are a very recent phenomenon, and they continue to
develop and evolve at a whirlwind pace.267 The Board has only just begun to
address the many issues raised by this new mode of communication.268 Thus
far, however, it has missed the mark.269 During the past several years, the
Board consistently found that employees engaged in protected concerted
activity when they posted negative statements about their employers on
social media websites.270 In so doing, the Board failed to acknowledge or
appreciate the important aspects of social media that make it wholly distinct
from the traditional workplace environment.271
The Board tries to force a square peg into a round hole when it insists on

260. See supra notes 190–204.
261. Stephanie Chen, Workplace Rants on Social Media are Headache for Companies, CNN
(May 12, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/05/12/social.media.work.rants/
index.html.
262. See supra Part IV.
263. See supra notes 186–220.
264. See supra note 147.
265. See infra notes 267–68 and accompanying text.
266. Philip Gordon, NLRB Report Challenges Validity of Many Commonly Used Social Media
Policies, WORKPLACE PRIVACY COUNS. (Jan. 27, 2012), http://privacyblog.littler.com/2012/01/
articles/labor-relations/nlrb-report-challenges-validity-of-many-commonly-used-social-mediapolicies/.
267. See supra notes 4–14 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 176–232 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 136–75 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 176–232 and accompanying text.
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applying dated law to current social media cases.272 Rather than taking this
opportunity to develop a new analytical framework and apply it to social
media, the Board instead fell back on old precedent.273 Although the canon
of protected activity cases (Meyers, Atlantic Steel, Jefferson Standard,
Mushroom Transportation, etc.) is helpful to a certain degree in assessing
employee communications via social media websites, these cases cannot
adequately resolve all of the issues that spring forth from this novel
territory.274
The Board should consider both the public nature of social media as
well as employees’ intent in broadcasting their thoughts online when
determining whether an activity is concerted protected activity.275 These
significant factors enable the Board to more accurately identify whether
employees’ speech seeks to initiate group action or to further individual
interests.276 Under the proposed analysis above, then, employees must lose
the protection of the Act when they post negative statements about their
employer on social media websites for three reasons.277 First, they lack the
requisite intent to initiate group activity.278 Second, the public appeal to
third parties renders the action so disloyal as to lose protection under the
NLRA.279 Finally, when employees simply complain about the workplace
instead of seeking to band together to address their working conditions, they
engage in mere griping, which is always unprotected.280 For the foregoing
reasons, the Board should alter its current analysis of social media cases and
allow employers to prohibit employees from making disparaging remarks
about their organizations on social network websites.281

Natalie J. Ferrall*

272. See supra notes 176–220 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 184–208 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 47–135 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 215–32 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 181–214 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 157–67 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 204–35 and accompanying text.
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